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Although a chain of bank failures remains an important symbol of systemic risk, 
the ongoing trend towards disintermediation—or enabling companies to directly access 
the ultimate source of funds, the capital (i.e., financial) markets, without going through 
banks or other financial intermediaries—is making these failures less critical than in the 
past. While banks and other financial institutions remain important sources of capital, 
companies today are able to obtain most of their financing through financial markets 
without the use of intermediaries.1 As a result, financial markets themselves are increas-
ingly central to any examination of systemic risk. 
 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The relationship between financial markets and systemic risk has been 
dramatically illustrated by the recent financial crisis. Although the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers filled the initial headlines, the trigger of the crisis was the collapse of 
the market for mortgage-backed securities. A significant number of these securities were 
backed by risky subprime home mortgages, which were expected to be refinanced 
through home appreciation. When home prices stopped appreciating, the borrowers 
could not refinance. In many cases, they defaulted. These defaults in turn caused 
                                                
* This article was referenced in Professor Schwarcz’s testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affair on May 18, 2011. The article is itself based on his keynote address at the March 2011 George 
Mason University AGEP Advanced Policy Institute on Financial Services Regulation. 
** Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law; Founding/Co-
Academic Director, Duke Global Capital Markets Center. E-mail: schwarcz@law.duke.edu. I thank 
Kenneth Anderson and participants in the George Mason University AGEP Advanced Policy Institute, 
supra note 1, for valuable comments. 
1 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200 (2008). 
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substantial amounts of investment-grade rated securities backed by these mortgages to 
be downgraded and, in some cases, to default. Investors began losing confidence in these 
and other rated securities, and their market prices started falling.  
Lehman Brothers, which held large amounts of mortgage-backed securities, was 
particularly exposed. Firms that had been doing business with Lehman—its 
‘counterparties’—began demanding additional safeguards, which Lehman could not 
provide. As a result, absent a government bailout, Lehman could not continue doing 
business. The refusal of the Government to save Lehman Brothers, and Lehman’s 
resulting bankruptcy, added to this cascade. Securities markets became so panicked that 
even the short-term commercial paper market virtually shut down, and the market prices 
of mortgage-backed securities collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the 
mortgage assets underlying those securities.2  
The collapse became a death spiral as banks and other financial institutions 
holding mortgage-backed securities had to write down their value under “mark-to-
market” accounting rules. This caused these firms to appear more financially risky, in 
turn triggering widespread concern over counterparty risk. The high leverage of many of 
these firms effectively required fire-sales of assets, exacerbating the fall in prices. 
Although the Dodd-Frank Act prescribes many steps to attempt to prevent another 
financial crisis, most of these steps focus on banks and other financial institutions, not on 
financial markets. Such a limited focus worked well when banks and financial institu-
tions were the primary source of corporate financing. But the financial crisis reveals that 
this focus is insufficient now that companies obtain much of their financing directly 
through financial markets—such as through securitization financing.3 Both financial in-
stitutions and financial markets can (if they fail) be triggers, and also transmitters, of 
systemic risk.  
 
REGULATORY APPROACHES TO SYSTEMIC RISK  
So how should we regulate systemic risk? The primary (if not sole) justification 
for regulating financial risk is the maximization of economic efficiency. Because 
systemic risk is a form of financial risk, efficiency should be a central goal in its 
                                                
2 For example, in July 2008 I was an expert in the Orion Finance SIV case in the English High Court 
of Justice. Orion’s mortgage-backed securities had a market value of around 22 cents on the dollar, 
whereas the present value of its reasonably-expected cash flows was around 88 cents on the dollar 
because most of the mortgages were prime. 
3 Securitization generally involves the issuance by special-purpose entities of securities backed by a 
wide range of financial assets, such as mortgage loans, and the process of creating and issuing those 
securities. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 
221 (2009). 
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regulation. But systemic risk creates an added regulatory dimension: without regulation, 
the externalities—harm to third parties—would not be prevented or internalized because 
systemic risk is a risk to the financial system itself. Market participants are motivated to 
protect themselves, but they are not as directly motivated to protect the system as a 
whole.  
As a result, there is a type of “tragedy of the commons,” a collective action 
problem in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual 
market participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resources, 
whereas the costs of exploitation, which affect the real economy, are distributed among 
an even wider class of persons.4 Any regulation of systemic risk thus should focus not 
only on traditional efficiency but also on the stability of the financial system.  
In examining regulatory approaches to systemic risk, one should also take into 
account the costs of regulation. There are direct costs, such as hiring government 
employees to monitor and enforce the regulations. But more importantly there can be 
indirect costs, such as overregulation that stifles innovation and competitiveness. Subject 
to that caveat, a range of possible regulatory approaches, aimed at making the financial 
system more efficient and stable, should be considered when assessing Dodd-Frank. 
 
Averting Panics. The ideal regulatory approach would focus on eliminating the 
risk of systemic collapse from the outset. This goal could be substantially achieved by 
preventing financial panics, since they are often the triggers that commence a chain of 
failures.5 The recent financial crisis itself, for example, was initially triggered by 
financial market panic. But any regulation aimed at preventing panics that trigger 
systemic risk would almost certainly fail to anticipate all the causes of the panics. 
Furthermore, even when identified, panics cannot always be averted easily because 
investors are not always rational.6  
 
Requiring Increased Disclosure. Another potential regulatory approach is to 
improve disclosure. Disclosing risks traditionally has been viewed, at least under U.S. 
securities law, as the primary market-regulatory mechanism.7 Dodd-Frank puts great 
stock in the idea of improving disclosure.8 Disclosure works by reducing, if not 
                                                
4 See Schwarcz, supra note 1 (explaining this concept). 
5 See id. at 214 (providing examples of regulatory means to avert financial panics).  
6 For an analysis of how regulation can help to mitigate the impact of panic in financial securities 
markets see infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.  
7 See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999) (discussing the general purpose of disclosure in the 
Exchange Act and the Securities Act). 
8 E.g. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1103, 
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eliminating, asymmetric information among market players, making the risks transparent 
to all. In the context of systemic risk, however, individual market participants who fully 
understand that risk will be motivated to protect themselves but not necessarily the 
system as a whole. As a result of the aforesaid tragedy-of-the-commons, a market 
participant may well decide to engage in a profitable transaction even though doing so 
could increase systemic risk, since much of the harm from a possible systemic collapse 
would be externalized. 
Furthermore, the efficacy of disclosure is limited by the increasing complexity of 
transactions and markets.9 In the financial crisis, for example, there is little question that 
most, if not all, of the risks  regarding the complex mortgage-backed securities were 
disclosed.10 Yet many institutional investors bought these securities based primarily on 
their ratings, without fully understanding them. There are at least four reasons why 
disclosure failed:  
(i) Investors overrelied on heuristics such as rating-agency ratings. Dodd-Frank 
attempts to fix this problem by focusing on ratings, not on investors.11 However, the 
actions of S&P and Moody’s arguably met the Act’s requirements, had those 
requirements applied during the financial crisis. The real problem is not rating agency 
failure but investor complacency. Because human nature cannot be easily changed, it is 
unclear—and Dodd-Frank does not address—how investor complacency can be 
remedied.  
(ii) Investors followed the herd in their investment choices. Again, this is an 
implacable problem of investor complacency. 
(iii) Conflicts of interest were created by short-term management compensation 
schemes, especially for technically sophisticated secondary managers.12 For example, as 
the VaR, or value-at-risk, model for measuring investment-portfolio risk became more 
accepted, financial firms began compensating secondary managers not only for 
generating profits but also for generating profits with low risks, as measured by VaR.13 
Thus, secondary managers turned to investment products with low VaR risk profile, like 
credit-defaults swaps that generate small gains but only rarely have losses. The managers 
                                                                                                                                                       
124 Stat. 1376, 2118 (2010) (requiring additional disclosure from the Federal Reserve). 
9 This increasing complexitiy may very well be the greatest challenge for the twenty-first century 
financial system. 
10 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. 
REV. 1109, 1110 (2008). 
11 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 931-939H. 
12 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-
Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 (2009). 
13 See, e.g., PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING FINANCIAL 
RISK 568 (3d ed. 2006). 
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knew, but did not always explain to their superiors, that any losses that might eventually 
occur would be huge. This is an intra-firm conflict, quite unlike the traditional focus of 
scholars and politicians on conflicts between senior executives and shareholders. Dodd-
Frank attempts to fix the traditional type of conflict but completely ignores the problem 
of secondary-management conflicts.14 
(iv) The retention by underwriters of residual risk portions may have fostered 
false confidence in buyers, in effect creating a mutual misunderstanding. Ironically, this 
could be exacerbated in the future by Dodd-Frank’s requirement that sellers of 
securitization products retain a minimum unhedged position in each class of products 
they sell.15 
 
Imposing Financial-Exposure Limits. The failure of one or more large and 
interconnected institutions could create defaults large enough to de-stabilize other 
highly-leveraged investors, increasing the likelihood of a systemic market meltdown. 
This suggests another possible approach to regulation: placing limits on an institution’s 
financial exposure. The following financial-exposure limits may be considered: 
(i) First, the limitation of an institution’s leverage could reduce the risk of failure 
of that institution in the first place. It could also reduce the likelihood of financial 
contagion between institutions. However, limiting leverage can create significant costs 
because some leverage is good, and there is no optimal across-the-board amount of 
leverage that is right for every institution. The Dodd-Frank Act, however, directs the 
Federal Reserve to set “prudential” capital standards for certain large financial 
institutions,16 including a maximum debt-to-equity ratio of 15:1.17 
(ii) Second, the limitation of an institution’s right to make risky investments could 
reduce that institution’s downside risk. It is, however, a highly paternalistic approach, 
substituting a blanket regulatory prescription for a firm’s own business judgment. One 
should be highly skeptical of any rule that attempts to protect a sophisticated financial 
institution from itself. Dodd-Frank’s implementation of the Volker Rule, however, 
attempts to do precisely that by limiting the ability of banks and certain other financial 
institutions to engage in “proprietary trading”—essentially investing in securities for 
                                                
14 Dodd-Frank’s attempt to fix the traditional conflict might actually backfire; recent research 
suggests that shareholders, even more than senior executives, want the company to take risks. See Iman 
Anabtawi, Who's the Boss? Re-writing the Rules of Corporate Governance, Chapman Law Review 2011 
Symposium Panel (Jan. 28, 2011), available at 
http://ibc.chapman.edu/Mediasite/Viewer/?peid=1976265402884963a7346be7bc42763b. 
15 See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 941, § 15G (directing the SEC to require sponsors of asset-backed 
securities to retain at least five percent of the credit risk of the underlying assets). 
16 Banks are already subject to the Basel capital requirements. 
17 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(j). 
 
 
 
IDENTIFYING AND MANAGING SYSTEMIC RISK              VOLUME 1 / 2011 
 
 
            
 
 
99 
their own account.18  
(iii) Third, the limitation of amounts of inter-institution financial exposure would 
facilitate stability by diversifying risk, in effect by reducing the losses of any given 
contractual counterparty and thus the likelihood that such losses would cause the 
counterparty to fail. Limits might also reduce the urgency, and hence the panic, that 
contractual counterparties feel about closing out their positions. This approach already 
applies to banks through lending limits, which restrict the amount of bank exposure to 
any given customer’s risk. Its application beyond banks to other financial institutions is 
potentially appealing given the increasing blurring of lines between banks and non-bank 
financial institutions and the high volumes of financial assets circulating among non-
bank financial entities. 
It is questionable, though, whether the government should impose financial 
exposure limits on large financial institutions. These institutions have already tried to 
protect themselves through risk management and risk mitigation. The financial crisis has 
raised questions, however, whether conflicts of interest among managers and other 
failures can undermine institutional risk management. Dodd-Frank addresses this 
problem by requiring many large public financial firms to establish risk committees, 
including at least one risk-management expert, responsible for enterprise-wide risk 
management oversight.19 
 
Limiting Financial Institution Size. This is related to financial exposure limits, but 
this approach also addresses potential moral-hazard from institutions who believe they 
are “too big to fail.” There is, however, no clear evidence of such risky behavior, and 
financial institutional losses in the recent financial crisis can be explained by other 
reasons. 
Financial institution size should not be artificially limited. Size should be 
governed by the economies of scale and scope needed for institutions to successfully 
compete, domestically and abroad—so long as that size is manageable. We should watch 
out, however, for institutions that increase their size, especially by acquisition of other 
institutions, primarily to satisfy senior management egos. Dodd-Frank indirectly 
addresses this concern (at least weakly) by linking senior executive compensation to 
long-term results—for example, requiring stock exchanges to adopt standards whereby 
listed companies implement policies to recoup senior executive compensation in the 
event of an accounting restatement. 20  
                                                
18 Id. sec. 619, § 13. 
19 Id. § 165(h). 
20 Id. § 954. 
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Ensuring Liquidity. Ensuring liquidity could facilitate stability in two ways: by 
providing liquidity to financial institutions in order to prevent them from defaulting, and 
by providing liquidity to financial markets as necessary to keep them functioning.  
The Federal Reserve Bank has had the role (under §13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act) of lender of last resort by providing liquidity to banks and other financial 
institutions in order to prevent them from defaulting. 21 However, acting as a lender of 
last resort to institutions can be costly. By providing a lifeline, a lender of last resort can 
at least theoretically foster moral hazard by encouraging financial institutions—
especially those that believe they are “too big to fail”—to be fiscally reckless. It can also 
shift costs to taxpayers since loans made to institutions will not be repaid if the 
institutions eventually fail.  
For these reasons, the Dodd-Frank Act sharply limits the power of the Federal 
Reserve to make emergency loans to individual or insolvent financial institutions. 22 That 
categorical limitation appears somewhat excessive, though; a lender of last resort can be 
an important safeguard if it acts judiciously. 
One way that Dodd-Frank attempts to avoid the need to make emergency loans is 
by requiring banks and—to the extent designated as “systemically important”—other 
financial firms to be subject to a range of capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements23 
and periodic “stress testing.” 24 It also requires these entities to submit a resolution plan 
(a “living will”) that sets forth how, in the case of failure, the firm would wind down in a 
way that minimizes systemic impact. 25 The intention behind these provisions is to 
prevent failure and, if failure occurs, to mitigate the need for emergency loans by 
allowing the firm to fail in an orderly manner. The ultimate question, though, will be 
whether the ex ante plan matches the ex post reality.  
Regardless of how one views a lender of last resort to financial institutions, the 
financial crisis has shown that, in an era of disintermediation, more attention needs to 
be focused on providing liquidity to financial markets as necessary to keep them 
functioning. This approach should also be less costly than lending to institutions. A 
market liquidity provider of last resort, especially if it acts at the outset of a market 
panic, can profitably invest in securities at a deep discount from the market price and 
still provide a “floor” to how low the market will drop.26 Buying at a deep discount will 
                                                
21 Federal Reserve Act of 1913 § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2010). 
22 Dodd-Frank Act § 1101. 
23 Id. § 115(b) 
24 Id. § 165(i). 
25 Id. § 165(d). 
26 This is very different from quantitative easing, in which a central bank purchases securities as a 
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mitigate moral hazard and also make it likely that the market liquidity provider will be 
repaid.  
 
Reducing Complexity. An obvious way to address complexity would be to require 
investments and other financial products to be more standardized, so market participants 
do not need to engage in as much due diligence. One of the goals of Dodd-Frank is to 
standardize more derivatives transactions. To this end, the Act requires many derivatives 
to be cleared through clearinghouses,27 which generally require a high degree of 
standardization28 in the derivatives they clear.29 The overall economic impact of 
standardization is unclear, though, because standardization can interfere with the ability 
of parties to achieve the efficiencies that arise when firms craft derivatives tailored to 
particular needs of investors.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three regulatory initiatives that go beyond Dodd-Frank could address the 
aforementioned concerns: (1) requiring that managers, including secondary managers, of 
financial institutions be compensated based more on long-term firm performance; (2) 
establishing a market liquidity provider of last resort; (3) requiring financial institutions 
of systemic significance to contribute to a fund that would be used to mitigate systemic 
externalities. 
A market liquidity provider of last resort would have the best chance of 
minimizing a systemic collapse under any number of circumstances. Chaos theory 
supports the concept of a market liquidity provider of last resort. In complex engineering 
systems, as in complex financial markets, failures are inevitable. Therefore modularity is 
needed to break the transmission of these failures and limit their systemic consequences. 
                                                                                                                                                       
form of monetary policy. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve recently concluded a $600 billion 
quantitative easing program of purchasing U.S. Treasury securities in order to hold down long-term 
interest rates. See, e.g., Burton Frierson, Richard Leong, & Chris Reese, Federal Reserve Announces It 
Will Conclude Quantitative Easing, HUFFINGTON POST, June 10, 2011, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/10/federal-reserve-plans-to-_n_875044.html. In contrast, the 
task of a market liquidity provider of last resort (as contemplated by this article) would be much more 
targeted: to prevent market collapses due to panic. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text 
(explaining how a market liquidity provider of last resort would act).     
27 Id. sec. 723(a), § 2. 
28 See Martin N. Baily et al., Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Exchanges 4 (Squam Lake 
Working Group on Financial Regulation, Working Paper, July 2009), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Squam_Lake_Working_Paper5.pdf. 
29 This can become a little circular, though, because Dodd-Frank includes an exception for derivatives 
that a clearinghouse will not accept for clearing. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 723(a), § 2(h)(3). Further, the 
clearinghouse requirement might inadvertently concentrate systemic risk in the clearinghouses 
themselves. 
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Such a mechanism usually exists (or should exist) for banks, in the form of a liquidity 
provider of last resort; we also need this type of mechanism for complex financial 
markets.30 
Recent experience in the financial crisis supports establishment of a market 
liquidity provider of last resort. In response to the collapse of the commercial paper 
market, the Federal Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) to 
act as a lender of last resort for that market, with the goal of addressing “temporary 
liquidity distortions” by purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that 
could not otherwise sell their paper.31 The CPFF apparently helped to stabilize the 
commercial paper market.32 
This same approach can be applied more generally to respond to panic in 
securities market. Say, for example, that the intrinsic value—effectively the present 
value of the expected value of the underlying cash flows—of a type of mortgage-backed 
security is estimated to be in the range of 80 cents on the dollar. If the market price of 
those securities had fallen significantly below that number, say, to 20 cents on the dollar, 
the market liquidity provider could purchase these securities at, say, 60 cents on the 
dollar, thereby stabilizing the market and still making a profit. To induce a holder of the 
mortgage-backed securities to sell at that price, the market liquidity provider could, for 
example, agree to pay a higher “deferred purchase price” if the securities turn out to be 
worth more than expected.33 This is just one (simplified) example of the flexible pricing 
approaches used in structured financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain 
value which could be adapted to a market liquidity provider’s purchases.34 
One might ask why, if a market liquidity provider of last resort can invest at a 
deep discount to stabilize markets and still make money, private investors would not also 
do so, thereby eliminating the need for some sort of governmental market liquidity 
provider. One answer is that individuals at investing firms will not want to jeopardize 
their reputations (and jobs) by causing their firms to invest at a time when other 
                                                
30 See Schwarcz, supra note 3. 
31 See Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough, & Dina Marchioni, The Federal Reserve’s Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 423 (April 1, 2010). 
32 Id. at 11 (concluding that “[t]he CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the commercial paper 
market”). 
33 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big To Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net, in THE PANIC OF 
2008 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., Edward Elgar 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352563 (where this example was taken from). 
34 Alternatively, the market liquidity provider of last resort could attempt to stabilize the market by 
entering into derivatives contracts to strip out risks that the market has the greatest difficulty hedging—in 
effect, the market’s irrationality element—thereby stimulating private investment. By hedging—and not 
actually purchasing securities directly—the market liquidity provider would appear to be taking less 
investment risk, and thus its function may be seen as more politically acceptable. Id. 
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investors have abandoned the market. Another answer is that private investors usually 
want to buy and sell securities, without having to wait for their maturities; whereas a 
market liquidity provider of last resort should be able to wait until maturity, if necessary.  
The third recommendation—to require financial institutions of systemic 
significance to contribute to a systemic risk fund—responds to the tragedy-of-the-
commons problem by helping to mitigate systemic externalities. This type of approach 
was originally provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, but it was taken out before enactment 
because of opposition by politicians who believed (perhaps wrongly) that it would 
increase moral hazard by institutionalizing bailouts.35  
A privately-funded systemic risk fund not only can mitigate systemic externalities 
but also can help minimize the potential for risky behavior caused by institutions that 
believe they are too big to fail. The too-big-to-fail problem is effectively an externality 
imposed on government (and ultimately taxpayers) by an institution engaging in such 
risky behavior. A privately-funded systemic risk fund would help to internalize that 
externality. Furthermore, the ability of government to require additional contributions to 
this type of fund should motivate contributors to the fund to monitor each other in order 
to reduce the potential for such risky behavior.  
Recently, the European Commission has been toying with the idea of a systemic 
risk fund in connection with its proposal to tax the financial sector.36 Although the 
ultimate use of the tax revenues is currently unresolved, news reports indicate that an 
originally contemplated use was a systemic risk fund.37 The IMF also appears to be 
using the European Commission tax proposal as a platform to announce that “new taxes 
on banks [are] needed to provide an insurance fund for future financial meltdowns and to 
curb excessive risktaking.”38  
The European Commission recognizes that in order to avoid making the EU 
financial sector uncompetitive, any tax on the financial sector should be applied in all 
financial centres. This illustrates a broader principle: because financial markets and 
institutions increasingly cross sovereign borders, any regulatory approaches must be 
designed to work in an international context. The Dodd-Frank Act does not, however, 
                                                
35 S. Amdt. 3827, 111th Cong. (2010) (eliminating the proposed $50 billion dollar fund, financed by a 
tax on banks, that would help wind down failed financial companies). 
36 European Commission, Taxation of the Financial Sector, a Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: (Brussels COM (2010) 549/5; SEC (2010) 1166). 
37 Commission Proposes a Bank Tax to Cover the Costs of Winding Down Banks that Go Bust (May 
26, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/news/economy/100526_en.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
38 Larry Elliott & Jill Treanor, IMF: Supervise and Tax Banks or Risk Crisis, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 
2010, at 25 (London-final ed.) (paraphrasing an announcement by the IMF’s then-Managing Director 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn). 
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fully come to grips with how the U.S. financial regulatory framework should operate, or 
even fit, as part of a global financial regulatory framework. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We have made some, but not nearly enough, progress in identifying and 
managing systemic risk. Being a political response, Dodd-Frank consists largely of 
politically targeted responses to the recent financial crisis, at times looking for villains 
(whether or not they exist) who caused the crisis. To be most effective, however, 
financial regulation must be situated within an analytical framework that realistically 
explains how systemic risk is transmitted and why free-market factors do not limit that 
transmission.39 The tragedy of the commons, for example, is certainly part of that 
explanation.40  
The Dodd-Frank Act nonetheless has the potential to ultimately reach beyond po-
litically targeted responses. The Act delegates much of the regulatory details to adminis-
trative rulemaking, in many cases after the relevant government agencies engage in fur-
ther study. Perhaps even more significantly, the Act creates a Financial Stability Over-
sight Council, part of whose mission is to monitor and identify potential systemic threats 
in order to find regulatory gaps. 41 The Council will be aided in this task by a newly-
created and, hopefully, nonpartisan Office of Financial Research. 42 In these ways, regu-
lators have the ability to look beyond the Act’s confines. This article has attempted to 
provide ideas they might pursue. 
 
                                                
39 See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical 
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV., issue no. 4 (forthcoming Spring 2011). 
40 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549 (2009) 
(arguing that the failures giving rise to the recent financial crisis can be attributed conceptually to at least 
four market imperfections: conflicts of interest, complacency of investors and other market participants, 
complexity of financial markets and of the securities traded therein, and the tragedy of the commons). 
41 Dodd-Frank Act § 112. 
42 Id. 
